Quds Force Commander’s Advice to Gen Petraeus
March 30, 2010 by Steven OHern
Although it’s previously been reported that Kassim Suleimani (or Qassem Suleimani), the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, made contact with U.S. forces during the battle for Basra in March 2008, hearing General David Petraeus recall the event is noteworthy. In February, the current CENTCOM commander answered questions at the Institute for the Study of War, the think tank headed by Dr. Kimberly Kagan. From the transcript of the Q&A with General Petraeus comes this insight into the boldness of the Quds Force:
You know, in the middle of the battle with the militia in March and April of 2008, a message was conveyed to me by a very senior Iraqi leader from the head of the Qods Force, Kassim Suleimani, whose message went as follows.
He said, General Petraeus, you should know that I, Kassim Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Qods Force member. The individual who’s going to replace him is a Qods Force member.Now, that makes diplomacy difficult if you think that you’re going to do the traditional means of diplomacy by dealing with another country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because in this case, it is not the ministry. It’s not Mottaki who controls the foreign policy, again, for these countries, at least. It is, again, a security apparatus, the Qods Force, which is also carrying out other activities.
Details on Suicide Bomb Attack at CIA Base – FOB Chapman
January 11, 2010 by Steven OHern
Greetings, readers, if there are any left, of this blog. I will be more active in 2010 – my apologies for the lack of productivity last year.
STRATFOR, the private intelligence and forecasting service, has released the following information about how Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the Jordanian double agent, managed to inflict such substantial damage upon so many CIA personnel at FOB Chapman near Khost, Afghanistan. My thanks to STRATFOR for allowing its republication on The Intelligence Wars blog
THE KHOST ATTACK AND THE INTELLIGENCE WAR CHALLENGE
By George Friedman and Scott Stewart
As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing. The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived.
Al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor from Zarqa (the hometown of deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Under the alias Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, he served as an administrator for Al-Hesbah, a popular Internet discussion forum for jihadists. Jordanian officers arrested him in 2007 because of his involvement with radical online forums, which is illegal in Jordan. The GID subsequently approached al-Balawi while he was in a Jordanian prison and recruited him to work as an intelligence asset.
Al-Balawi was sent to Pakistan less than a year ago as part of a joint GID/CIA mission. Under the cover of going to school to receive advanced medical training, al-Balawi established himself in Pakistan and began to reach out to jihadists in the region. Under his al-Khurasani pseudonym, al-Balawai announced in September 2009 in an interview on a jihadist Internet forum that he had officially joined the Afghan Taliban.
A Lucky Break for the TTP
It is unclear if al-Balawi was ever truly repentant. Perhaps he cooperated with the GID at first, but had a change of heart sometime after arriving in Pakistan. Either way, at some point al-Balawi approached the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban group, and offered to work with it against the CIA and GID. Al-Balawi confirmed this in a video statement recorded with TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud and released Jan. 9. This is significant because it means that al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, and not part of some larger, intentional intelligence operation orchestrated by the TTP or another jihadist entity like al Qaeda.
The TTP’s luck held when a group of 13 people gathered to meet al-Balawi upon his arrival at FOB Chapman. This allowed him to detonate his suicide device amid the crowd and create maximum carnage before he was able to be searched for weapons.
In the world of espionage, source meetings are almost always a dangerous activity for both the intelligence officer and the source. There are fears the source could be surveilled and followed to the meeting site, or that the meeting could be raided by host country authorities and the parties arrested. In the case of a terrorist source, the meeting site could be attacked and those involved in the meeting killed. Because of this, the CIA and other intelligence agencies exercise great care while conducting source meetings. Normally they will not bring the source into a CIA station or base. Instead, they will conduct the meeting at a secure, low-profile offsite location.
Operating in the wilds of Afghanistan is far different from operating out of an embassy in Vienna or Moscow, however. Khost province is Taliban territory, and it offers no refuge from the watching eyes and gunmen of the Taliban and their jihadist allies. Indeed, the province has few places safe enough even for a CIA base. And this is why the CIA base in Khost is located on a military base, FOB Chapman, named for the first American killed in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion. Normally, an outer ring of Afghan security around the base searches persons entering FOB Chapman, who the U.S. military then searches again at the outer perimeter of the U.S. portion of the base. Al-Balawi, a high-value CIA asset, was allowed to skip these external layers of security to avoid exposing his identity to Afghan troops and U.S. military personnel. Instead, the team of Xe (the company formerly known as Blackwater) security contractors were to search al-Balawi as he arrived at the CIA’s facility.
A Failure to Follow Security Procedures
Had proper security procedures been followed, the attack should only have killed the security contractors, the vehicle driver and perhaps the Jordanian GID officer. But proper security measures were not followed, and several CIA officers rushed out to greet the unscreened Jordanian source. Reports indicate that the source had alerted his Jordanian handler that he had intelligence pertaining to the location of al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. (There are also reports that al-Balawi had given his handlers highly accurate battle damage assessments on drone strikes in Pakistan, indicating that he had access to high-level jihadist sources.) The prospect of finally receiving such crucial and long-sought information likely explains the presence of the high-profile visitors from CIA headquarters in Langley and the station in Kabul — and their exuberance over receiving such coveted intelligence probably explains their eager rush to meet the source before he had been properly screened.
The attack, the most deadly against CIA personnel since the 1983 Beirut bombing, was clearly avoidable, or at least mitigable. But human intelligence is a risky business, and collecting human intelligence against jihadist groups can be flat-out deadly. The CIA officers in Khost the day of the bombing had grown complacent, and violated a number of security procedures. The attack thus serves as a stark reminder to the rest of the clandestine service of the dangers they face and of the need to adhere to time-tested security procedures.
A better process might have prevented some of the deaths, but it would not have solved the fundamental problem: The CIA had an asset who turned out to be a double agent. When he turned is less important than that he was turned into — assuming he had not always been — a double agent. His mission was to gain the confidence of the CIA as to his bona fides, and then create an event in which large numbers of CIA agents were present, especially the top al Qaeda analyst at the CIA. He knew that high-value targets would be present because he had set the stage for the meeting by dangling vital information before the agency. He went to the meeting to carry out his true mission, which was to deliver a blow against the CIA. He succeeded.
The Obama Strategy’s Weakness
In discussing the core weakness in the Afghan strategy U.S. President Barack Obama has chosen, we identified the basic problem as the intelligence war. We argued that establishing an effective Afghan army would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because the Americans and their NATO allies lacked knowledge and sophistication in distinguishing friend from foe among those being recruited into the army. This problem is compounded by the fact that there are very few written documents in a country like Afghanistan that could corroborate identities. The Taliban would seed the Afghan army with its own operatives and supporters, potentially exposing the army’s operations to al Qaeda.
This case takes the problem a step further. The United States relied on Jordanian intelligence to turn a jihadist operative into a double agent. They were dependent on the Jordanian handler’s skills at debriefing, vetting and testing the now-double agent. It is now reasonable to assume the agent allowed himself to be doubled in an attempt to gain the trust of the handler. The Jordanians offered the source to the Americans, who obviously grabbed him, and the source passed all the tests to which he was undoubtedly subjected. Yet in the end, his contacts with the Taliban were not designed to provide intelligence to the Americans. The intelligence provided to the Americans was designed to win their trust and set up the suicide bombing. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that al-Balawi was playing the GID all along and that his willingness to reject his jihadist beliefs was simply an opportunistic strategy for surviving and striking.
Even though encountering al-Balawi was a stroke of luck for the TTP, the group’s exploitation of this lucky break was a very sophisticated operation. The TTP had to provide valuable intelligence to allow al-Balawi to build his credibility. It had to create the clustering of CIA agents by promising extraordinarily valuable intelligence. It then had to provide al-Balawi with an effective suicide device needed for the strike. And it had to do this without being detected by the CIA. Al-Balawi had a credible cover for meeting TTP agents; that was his job. But what al-Balawi told his handlers about his meetings with the TTP, and where he went between meetings, clearly did not indicate to the handlers that he was providing fabricated information or posed a threat.
In handling a double agent, it is necessary to track every step he takes. He cannot be trusted because of his history; the suspicion that he is still loyal to his original cause must always be assumed. Therefore, the most valuable moments in evaluating a double agent are provided by intense scrutiny of his patterns and conduct away from his handlers and new friends. Obviously, if this scrutiny was applied, al-Balawi and his TTP handlers were still able to confuse their observers. If it was not applied, then the CIA was setting itself up for disappointment. Again, such scrutiny is far more difficult to conduct in the Pakistani badlands, where resources to surveil a source are very scarce. In such a case, the intuition and judgment of the agent’s handler are critical, and al-Balawi was obviously able to fool his Jordanian handler.
Given his enthusiastic welcome at FOB Chapman, it would seem al-Balawi was regarded not only as extremely valuable but also as extremely reliable. Whatever process might have been used at the meeting, the central problem was that he was regarded as a highly trusted source when he shouldn’t have been. Whether this happened because the CIA relied entirely on the Jordanian GID for evaluation or because American interrogators and counterintelligence specialists did not have the skills needed to pick up the cues can’t be known. What is known is that the TTP ran circles around the CIA in converting al-Balawi to its uses.
The United States cannot hope to reach any satisfactory solution in Afghanistan unless it can win the intelligence war. But the damage done to the CIA in this attack cannot be underestimated. At least one of the agency’s top analysts on al Qaeda was killed. In an intelligence war, this is the equivalent of sinking an aircraft carrier in a naval war. The United States can’t afford this kind of loss. There will now be endless reviews, shifts in personnel and re-evaluations. In the meantime, the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be attempting to exploit the opportunity presented by this disruption.
Casualties happen in war, and casualties are not an argument against war. However, when the center of gravity in a war is intelligence, and an episode like this occurs, the ability to prevail becomes a serious question. We have argued that in any insurgency, the insurgents have a built-in advantage. It is their country and their culture, and they are indistinguishable from everyone else. Keeping them from infiltrating is difficult.
This was a different matter. Al-Balawi was Jordanian; his penetration of the CIA was less like the product of an insurgency than an operation carried out by a national intelligence service. And this is the most troubling aspect of this incident for the United States. The operation was by all accounts a masterful piece of tradecraft beyond the known abilities of a group like the TTP. Even though al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, not the result of an intentional, long-term operation, the execution of the operation that arose as a result of that lucky break was skillfully done — and it was good enough to deliver a body blow to the CIA. The Pakistani Taliban would thus appear far more skilled than we would have thought, which is the most important takeaway from this incident, and something to ponder.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com.
Copyright 2010 Stratfor.
The Intelligence Officer’s Lament
September 20, 2009 by Steve
While catching up on my fiction reading, I came across this observation by an experienced but cautious CIA headquarters man in Agents of Innocence by David Ignatius. Stone, a veteran of the CIA that was not burdened with senseless rules in the days immediately following World War II, counsels Tom Rogers, the novel’s protagonist, about the maddening bureaucratic nature of secret organizations like intelligence agencies:
“This is the life cycle of a bureaucracy. Supple in youth. Rigid in middle age. Weak and decaying in old age. Organizations are like any other sort of animal. Their strongest instinct is to survive and reproduce themslves. It may be that the problems are greater in a secret organization like ours, where the bureaucratic culture is sealed off from the outside. But they aren’t fundamentally different.”
“What do you suggest?” asked Rogers.
“Take risks. Lean against the wind,” said Stone. “Listen to correct advice and ignore incorrect advice.”
“How do you know the difference?”
“Let us order dessert, shall we?” said Stone.
Comment: And as Stone’s final comment suggests, theory and observations about a bureaucracy are easier to dispense than developing a workable plan to succeed in spite of the bureaucracy. Agents of Innocence is set in 1970s in Lebanon, but the observation that David Ignatius placed on the lips of his character Stone is still accurate.
The novel accurately describes the huge amount of detailed information demanded by a headquarters prior to recruitment of an agent and the narrow view of how agents are to be motivated and controlled that is held by some intelligence officers (especially those at a headquarters.)
The Mission, the Men, and Pete Blaber
July 28, 2009 by Steven OHern
Pete Blaber has written an excellent book, The Mission, the Men, and Me that uses examples from his Delta Force career to illustrate some leadership lessons. But intelligence officers and users of intelligence would gain much from applying the same lessons to the craft of intelligence.
One lesson that is particularly applicable to intelligence that is conveyed by Blaber is “Always listen to the man on the ground.” Blaber learned this lesson both as a leader of a team trying to gather as much information as possible about a target and as the commander of a unit that had information vital to Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan that was ignored by higher commanders. Blaber’s account of Operation Anaconda is gut wrenching as he details what information was available from his teams whose members had infiltrated the high ground of the Shahi Khot Valley and were providing a detailed and current situation report as well as directing devastating air strikes against the al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the valley. Yet that information was not just overlooked, it was ignored by the commanders planning and leading the insertion of a Navy SEAL team and the Quick Reaction Force sent to rescue a SEAL and an Air Force Combat Controller who were stranded during the SEAL team’s attempted insertion.
The higher up (and further back from the battle) commanders were lulled into thinking they had sufficient situational awareness to make decisions without listening to the man on the ground because of their access to satellite radio transmissions and aerial views from UAVs. Blaber describes the UAV imagery as looking through a soda straw. You can see, but only so much and without the context of the wide angle view.
Blaber’s account of Operation Anaconda provides insight to intelligence personnel as it is another example of the military’s and intelligence community’s love affair with high-tech that makes many in those communities prefer what is obtained from technology over information obtained from the use of shoe leather (or synthetic hi-tech boot soles) and from talking to people. Similar to the lessons in The Intelligence Wars, Blaber’s book gives examples of the military’s propensity to not share information. At one point, Blaber was advised that he was cooperating too much by sharing information with the 10th Mountain Group and the CIA. Blaber also does a good job of explaining how rigid the Army’s planning process it and how it locks the Army into bad results by not allowing new information to affect decisions already made, but not implemented.
The man on the ground provides the best sense of what is going on and what is possible – whether the man on the ground is a commando on a mountaintop dug into a well-hidden observation post or a HUMINT operative in the same village where your target is. When will our leaders learn this lesson?
SEALS Link HUMINT to Action
July 15, 2009 by Steve
In The Sheriff of Ramadi author Dick Couch details how SEALs in Iraq successfully fused human intelligence with operators who could act upon the HUMINT and contrasts the SEALs willingness to share information with the tendency of other SOF units that don’t share intelligence with other military units.
The key to the SEALs’ effective intelligence operation is its dedication to developing and sharing intelligence. SEALs deploy to the fight in “Task Units” which are composed of a SEAL squadron (generally two SEAL platoons) and support personnel including a robust intelligence element referred to as the N2 section. Couch describes the N2 on pages 49-50 of his book:
Within this N2 shop there will most usually be an intelligence cell and a targeting cell. Personnel-wise, these two vital components may have anywhere from twelve to twenty intelligence specialists and support personnel and two or more officers. The N2 is also responsible for a task element known as the Advanced Special Operations unit whose missions and methods are classified. The ASO component will have a variety of specialists, including veteran SEAL operators. Their responsibilities range from the analytical to the operational. . . Other personnel assigned to the N2 shop range from interrogation specialists to linguists to civil-affairs officers. The collective job of the N2 section is to comb through the myriad of available intelligence information that passes through military channels for information that may relate to task unit mission requirements. They also manage the ongoing human and technical collection efforts so important to the TU’s targeting cell. Every SEAL I spoke with, from the TU commanders to the platoon operators – the shooters – could not say enough about the importance of their intelligence and targeting cells. Indeed, the SEAL assault elements and their Iraqi scouts seldom went into the field without knowing exactly where they were going and exactly who they were looking for, as well as the risk parameters going in, on target, and coming back out.
And in another section of Couch’s book (page 116), he quotes U.S. Army Captain Mike Bajema who served with SEALS at Ramadi regarding the Army infantry officer’s observation of the differences in working with Army special operations forces and the SEALs, especially their willingness to share information with others:
But one thing that came across right away with [the] SEALS I met that dat was their honesty. They didn’t care about a man’s branch of service or rank or physical size. I found that the SEALs tended to judge a man on his character, his courage under fire, and his determination to kill the enemy. I was never treated as anything less than an equal and always given the respect of being a different type of warrior on the battlefield. My preconception of the SEALs was solely abased on my experience working with the Army Special Forces teams. Those experiences were not positive, as the Army SOF community, in my experience, is quick to assert their sense of importance in most situations. First meetings are always a ‘tab check’ of who has the most Army [shoulder] tabs and school identifiers – airborne, Ranger, Special Forces, sapper, et cetera. This never happened with the SEALs. They only cared how a man performs or reacts when in contact with the enemy. . .
The Army SOF community I worked with previously was very reluctant to share their information with conventional forces. It seems like the information they had is too valuable or too secret to get passed on to others in the battlespace. The SEALs always followed the rules of disclosure but they worked really hard on passing information down to the conventional guys on the ground. In return I passed all informants I came across to the SEALs to develop as sources, as I was restricted as to how I could task these informants in the gathering of intelligence. The SEALs had the specially trained folks that could task and even pay sources for information.
ANALYSISCouch’sThe Sheriff of Ramadi demonstrates the importance of two critical points: First, linking intelligence analysts and targeting people with HUMINT collectors and the operators who go after the bad guys works well. It is clearly more efficient than the bureaucratic and disjointed method the conventional Army follows of separating the intelligence analysts from the collectors of information. Note the benchmark that should be the goal of intelligence in counterinsurgency: the operators always knew where they were going and who they were going after. This is much more effective COIN than patrols from main bases and cordon and search operations.
Second, the SEALs’ effectiveness was enhanced when they promoted the sharing of information. The testimony of the Army infantry officer who immediately noticed and appreciated the difference between Army SOF units who play “I have a secret” and don’t share intel and the SEALs who want to share information points to the utility of sharing information. Sharing information with other forces in the battlespace did more than make the SEALs popular with their fellow warriors. It caused others to refer human sources to them for exploitation because the people who referred the sources to them knew they would ultimately benefit from the intelligence developed.
